The planner and architect are seldom envisioned as advocates for the urban poor. However, during the 1960s, New Left planners and architects began working with marginalized groups in cities to design alternatives to urban renewal projects. This was part of a national advocacy planning movement that was taking shape in urban areas like Chicago. Inspired by critics of the Rational-comprehensive model of planning, advocacy planners opposed the imposition of projects on neighborhoods often with no collaboration from residents. One example of this resistance was Hank Williams Village-a multipurpose housing and commercial redevelopment project modeled after a southern town. The Village, as it came to be known, was an attempt to prevent the displacement of thousands of southern whites by the planned construction of a community college in Chicago's Uptown neighborhood. The events surrounding the rise and fall of Hank Williams Village represent a way to examine the viability of advocacy planning and intangible effects of community action. I conclude with a discussion of the legacy of advocacy planning its contemporary embodiment in progressive planning and recent link to environmental justice.
Personal Reflexive Statement
Some years back, I canvassed a neighbourhood, marched in demonstrations, and registered voters in an effort to reelect Alderwoman, Helen Shiller of the 46th Ward in Chicago. In the process, I discovered that white southerners had attempted to block the construction of a community college in their neighborhood because it would displace hundreds of families. Led by two advocacy planners and southern migrant, Chuck Geary, they produced an alternative neighborhood redevelopment plan that would preserve their homes called Hank Williams Village (Fraser 1970) . Hank Williams Village was never built because it failed to win the approval of the local urban renewal board. The title for this article was taken from a headline in a local Chicago newspaper after Geary formed the Voice of the People, a group opposing the site on which the college was planned (Butler 1968) . After learning of the Village, I began conducting research in a local Chicago library and came across a newspaper clipping that named the architect and planner. They were now in their 80s and living in Kentucky. After a brief phone conversation, they invited me to their home to share the information that they had about Hank Williams Village and advocacy planning. This article is dedicated to Rodney and Sydney Wright for their trust in me to guide readers through the fight for Hank Williams Village.
Advocacy on behalf of the poor was a popular avenue for those on the left in the1960s. During this time, there was a social awakening about the deep contradictions and cleavages in the American ethos and an almost religious zeal to alleviate them. Determined professionals and idealistic students armed with an ''agenda for a new generation'' took up posts as advocates for the disadvantaged in rural Appalachia and urban ghettos across the nation (Miller 1994) . While much is known about the professions of social work law and medicine in advocacy roles for the poor, little is known about planners and architects. This article examines an architect and planner in advocacy roles as part of a national advocacy planning movement in the United States. In the midst of the numerous urban renewal projects occurring simultaneously in the postwar era was a plan to construct a community college in Uptown, Chicago. The project was slated for a blight-ridden portion of the neighborhood and hailed by supporters, mostly local elites, as the key to revitalization. There was great resistance to the plan because it would displace hundreds of families living on the site. An overwhelming number of these residents were white southern migrants. Led by a fervent and eccentric southerner and a planner and architect, they proposed an alternative-Hank Williams Village. The Village, as it came to be known, was modeled after a small southern town.
The ability of the residents to mount opposition was not as unique as the process by which advocacy planning took place in Uptown. The events were illustrative of advocacy planning in action, and the conflict over the architect and planner's role. Historically, architects and planners remained detached, relying instead on technical expertise and professional disinterest in projects (Crawford 1991) . In this instance, advocacy planning meant inserting oneself into the messy fray and politics of groups competing over land use. Advocacy planning also unexpectedly inverted the traditional role of the planner and architect by allowing clients a democratic voice in the design process. In order to understand these events, it is necessary to trace the roots of advocacy planning as an oppositional response to Rational-comprehensive planning.
The Rise of Advocacy Planning in the United States
In the postwar era, the ''Rational-comprehensive'' approach dominated urban planning in the United States. In theory, this model paired community goals to planning objectives implemented with technical expertise on behalf of the public interest. Philosophically, this appears to be a laudable goal. However, the difficulty rests in determining whose interests best represent the community; rarely were they the interests of the poor (Peterman 2004) . As may be apparent to most, planning is not value free. In fact, ideally, value conflicts and their resolution should be part of the planning process. This is no small matter since the outcome of this sort of conflict usually points to the funding of projects. Therefore, to the extent that the disadvantaged segments of a community are not incorporated into the planning process, they are excluded from decisions that affect their communities (Cahill 1974 ). As will be seen, the case of Hank Williams Village challenges the view that access and participation equate to influence in decision making.
The Rational-comprehensive model dominated planning until challenges by those critical of urban renewal. Initially, Gans (1959) highlighted the pernicious effects of urban renewal, arguing that they displaced residents and subsidized their removal with higher rents. In addition, he pointed out that urban renewal was accompanied by the psychological trauma of losing friends and family members. Some credit Gans as having a seminal influence on the emergence of advocacy planning because of his emphasis on the need to protect residents from being displaced from urban renewal (Heskin 1980) . The notion of the ''planner as protector'' resonated with many activists and observers at the time witnessing the devastating consequences of urban renewal. Later, Jacobs (1961) criticized the outcome of planning and urban renewal as wreaking havoc on community and disrupting informal neighborhood controls, many of which prevented crime.
One of those extremely critical of comprehensive planning was Altshuler (1965) who questioned the philosophical assumptions of planning based on a single public interest, and therefore, a single best plan. He argued that planners could not determine the public interest because they were unable to obtain public debate and consensus on a comprehensive plan for a city. For him, this was essential in determining the interests of the community. As in an ideal democracy, in order for a plan to serve the public interest, there must be competing plans, spirited debate, and advocacy on behalf of the poor. In short, Altshuler challenged one of the basic philosophical premises behind the practice of Rational-comprehensive planning. This critique proved to be a significant blow to the manner in which planning was conducted in the United States (Innes 1996) . Davidoff (1965) however, is most directly credited with being the founder of advocacy planning. He questioned the objectivity of the concept, public interest, and stressed that planners should represent their clients in the same manner as attorneys. Davidoff argued that planning is political, and therefore an adversarial process. As such, planning should include the voices of all stakeholders, especially the poor and marginalized. That Davidoff believed in equal weight for all voices distinguished his approach from the pluralism of a single master plan. To accomplish this goal, Davidoff was a proponent of plural plans, because he believed that comprehensive planning tended to benefit elite groups in society (Peattie 1968) .
In the role as advocate, the planner is in a better position to inform the public of alternatives. For Davidoff, this would ultimately result in a plan that would better serve all interested parties, thus fulfilling the exigencies of democracy-the crux of the public interest. It later became important to him that planners be recruited from the lower and working classes to maximize the voice of the poor (Levy 2011) . That professional planners and architects would act as advocates for the poor in the planning process, distinguished them from community organizing by students and activists at the time. The professional was in an optimal position to bridge the gap between the technical rigors of planning, and educate the community simultaneously (Heskin 1980) .
The criticisms of the Rational-comprehensive model reached a peak in the middle of the 1960s and coincided with social discontent and protest in the United States. The notion of the planner as advocate and the vision of architects as activists accelerated with the urban crisis (e.g., struggles for civil rights and urban rioting) in the 1960s. Davidoff's vision of planning spurred many well-intentioned planners and architects to enter the fray of urban renewal on behalf of more marginalized residents. This movement was fueled by an exuberance that many professionals felt in the 1960s to intervene on behalf of the disadvantaged (Heskin 1980) , and led to first national organization of advocacy planners, Planning for Equal Opportunity (Thabit 1999) . The professions of law, social work, and medicine had their representatives in cities following the urban disorders. Architecture and planning professionals, including Rodney and Sydney Wright, were among the last to take up the torch for the poor in cities during this time.
As a response to the need for planners in poor communities and urban rioting that left many city areas in ruins, small independent planners began working in poor neighborhoods. Community Design Centers (CDCs) sprang up in Chicago, St. Louis, Harlem, and Philadelphia during the 1960s. One of the first CDCs was ARCH, the Architects' Renewal Council-a small independent experimental group of architects in Harlem. ARCH provided on-the-spot social design directly to the community. Most of the planners moved into the neighborhood in an effort to understand the needs of residents. In line with the philosophy to be responsive to community needs, ARCH featured African American planners and architects. Boston had its version of ARCH in Urban Planning Aid as well as Newark following the ravages of urban rioting (Huxtable 1967b:44) .
There were also the beginnings of national recognition by Civil Rights leaders of the advocacy planning movement. This was given added legitimacy when Bayard Rustin warned those attending an American Institute of Planners (AIP) conference in 1967 that the profession faced serious trouble if planners did not consider the needs of those for whom they planned. Rustin's comments followed urban rioting, which he attributed to a ''failure of democracy.'' Some of those in attendance were members of a splinter group of the AIP-Planners for Equal Opportunity. Although unofficial, the members urged the AIP to adopt advocacy-planning principles or face more urban disorder (Huxtable 1967a) .
One of the first things that advocacy planners challenged were urban renewal plans handed down from ''on high,'' which prioritized the project and gave little consideration to the community effects such as, displacement of the poor (Monahan 1969:33) . As planners and architects began to work in disadvantaged areas, there was a growing recognition that the concept of advocacy planning was not new in principle, but that it had never included the poor. In 1970, Executive Director of the American Institute of Architects (AIA), Wilbert R. Hasbrouck expressed this view in an interview when he stated that, '' . . . if you are designing a $100,000 residence, you make sure that the client has a big piece of the action . . . but with the poor it hasn't happened'' (Fraser 1970:2) . It was during this time that planners and architects began directly engaging poor residents in planning efforts. In doing so, they became enmeshed in political struggles over urban renewal and displacement of the poor (Monahan 1969) . Chicago was no exception. As many others, the city was feeling the effects of a postwar suburban exodus facilitated by a housing boom, rioting, urban decay, and diminishing tax revenue (Teaford 1991) .
A Confluence of People and Events: The Genesis of Hank Williams Village
Uptown, on Chicago's north side, (Figure 1 ) was a natural staging ground for advocacy planning because land use was, and continues to be, notoriously contentious. The area has long been known for being contested territory, and for having a bitter political history (Fremon 1988; Bennett 1997; Siegel 2002; Guy 2007) . Part of this is due to the presence of affluent homes along Lake Michigan, and concentration of poor residents in the central portion of Uptown. Since the Students for a Democratic Society's (SDS) Economic and Research Action Project (ERAP) beginning in 1964, Uptown has been known for activism and protest surrounding the issue of affordable housing (Gitlin and Hollander 1970; Bennett 1997) . Over the years, a plethora of community organizations have emerged to resist displacement of the poor from gentrification (Kass 1987) .
At the time that advocacy planning was taking shape, Uptown contained the largest concentration of southern whites in Chicago, an estimated 38 percent of Uptown residents (Strufert 1963; Guy 2007) . The thousands of southern whites who had migrated to Chicago and other midwestern cities during the 1950s and 1960s were responding to structural changes in mining and agriculture, which made migration a survival imperative for many (Kirby 1987; Jones 1991; Gregory 2005) . Uptown was affectionately known as ''Hillbilly Heaven'' to southern whites and the ''Hillbilly Ghetto'' and ''Hillbilly Jungle'' to many writers who opposed their presence in Chicago and depicted them as lazy, violent, and sexually deviant boozers (Bruno 1954; Browning 1957; Harwood 1966; Guy 2000) .
There were also indigenous leaders in Uptown like Chuck Geary, who had been influenced by the prior work of the SDS. He had come to Chicago in the late 1950s from eastern Kentucky, and became the most publicly associated figure with the Voice of the People (VOP) and the Uptown Area People's Planning Coalition (UAPPC). Geary, who had a knack for delivering charismatic public speeches, was difficult to pigeonhole. Journalists have characterized him as ''Lincolnesque'' because of his willowy stature and affable manner, and as a ''professional hillbilly'' with a ''stomp-on-the-tables and grab the microphone'' style of speaking (Chicago Magazine 1968; Backes 1968; Fitzpatrick 1970) . He was also adept at political maneuvering and could quickly mobilize several hundred protesters to disrupt a meeting.
The Birth of Opposition to Truman College
Urban renewal was in full swing throughout the United States in the 1960s. Federal funding for urban renewal was directed to neighborhoods that met the criteria of a ''conservation area.'' The City of Chicago had approved a 150-acre tract of land in Uptown for urban renewal in 1965, much of which was occupied by southern whites. As such, it became eligible for federal matching funds for redevelopment (Teaford 1991) . This portion of Uptown had long been eyed for urban renewal by the business-dominated Uptown Chicago Commission (UCC) because of its concentration of southern whites, seedy bars, transient hotels, and dilapidated apartment buildings. Local business executives and civic leaders formed the UCC in 1955 to champion urban renewal by promoting Uptown as a ''city within a city'' north of the Loop (Bennett 1997:76) .
In all cities, Conservation Community Councils (CCC), usually composed of 8 to 15 members, appointed by the mayor, recommended urban renewal projects to city planning departments. Often there was considerable overlap in membership between elite-dominated civic groups such as the UCC and the CCC (Teaford 1991) . In addition, urban renewal was increasingly being associated with displacing the poor, making the CCCs complicit in the process. One community worker in Uptown at the time commented that urban renewal projects were, '' . . . billed as 'cleaning up the area' and to poorer residents that can be interpreted as clearing them out . . . and creating a kind of community that they [the elite] want-one that I don't think would include the poor people of Uptown'' (Monahan 1969:35) .
In 1968, the Board of the Chicago City College unveiled a plan to relocate a community college in Uptown (Figure 2 ). The members of the Uptown CCC, many of whom were on the UCC, were elated, because they saw the college as the key to slum clearance and the revitalization of business in Uptown. For this reason, business owners enthusiastically supported the planned location of the college. Uptown appeared to be an ideal place because the buildings slated to be demolished would eradicate the urban decay in the central portion of Uptown. The location was highly desirable to the members of the UCC because of the numerous substandard buildings, Hillbilly bars, and transient hotels (Gray 1970) . It also appeared that demolition would take place rather quickly because the Chicago City College chancellor, Oscar Shabat, was under pressure by the accrediting body to settle on a location on the north side of Chicago (Blasko 1970) .
Chuck Geary responded to the announcement by forming the VOP amid chants of ''we shall not be moved'' by those attending the meeting (Butler 1968) . Shortly after this, he organized the UAPPC, an antidisplacement coalition composed of 11 organizations (Siegel 2002) . The UAPPC created a parallel committee to mirror the Uptown CCC, and reported their activities and demands at UCCC meetings (Dubkin 1968; Blasko 1968; Gaber 1968 ). The college plan was a flashpoint for Geary because of the planned demolition of housing in the heart of the southern white neighborhood. The initial plan called for displacing 7,500 people. Geary was a vocal opponent of the college, and convinced a large group of southerners to protest the plan at the next UCCC meeting (Butler 1968) . Architect Rodney Wright and planner Sydney Wright became the leading proponents of advocacy planning in Uptown. Both were highly inspired by the vision of planning with the poor and embodied Davidoff's call for architects to be recruited from the lower class. Rodney Wright was a self-taught architect, 1 of 19 children of a contractor from Valparaiso, Indiana. His wife, Sydney was a university-trained planner and part-time faculty member at a college in Chicago. Both shared a strident belief that the poor should be actively involved in the planning of their neighborhoods (Maier 1970) . Along with Chuck Geary, they opened the Uptown Design Center (UDC) in 1969 with a grant from the Ford Foundation. The UDC was housed in the UAPPC. Geary began working with the Wrights in the CDC with two homemade drafting tables, VISTA architect, Arnold Lerner, and 11 volunteers from the AIA instructing community members in the planning and design process (Fraser 1970) . Based on extensive input from Uptown residents at UAPPC meetings, the plan for what Geary called Hank Williams Village took shape (Fraser 1970) .
The Wrights produced their own design workbooks for the community in a simplified visual format to understand the planning process. Residents learned that neighborhoods could be pedestrian-centered with easy accessibility to services. Eventually the idea of cul-de-sacs, ''people streets'' parks, perpendicular parking, and basements used for day care centers and clinics were incorporated into the idea for Hank Williams Village. While working on Hank Williams Village, Wright justified his pedestrian-centered approach to a journalist. He was quoted as saying that ''in Uptown less than 50 percent of land use is used for housing, for people space, with the rest given over to streets, to the private car, to commercial uses . . . but there should be priorities'' (Monahan 1969:33 ). Wright's idea was to integrate all aspects of daily life through mixed land use in close proximity with pedestrian access while minimizing displacement (Rodney Wright and Associates 1971) .
The end product, Hank Williams Village, was patterned after a southern town. The plan to rehabilitate buildings instead of razing them minimized displacement of neighborhood residents (Inland Architect 1969). The Village was designed as a cooperative community with a town hall for meetings, child care and recreational facilities, a medical clinic, and a hotel for migrants (Gaber 1968 ). There were wide pedestrian streets, low-income housing, communal spaces, and generous numbers of trees (Fraser 1970) . Because of the communal setting, Geary insisted that the village would facilitate urban adaptation and a sense of belonging for southern migrants (Gaber 1968a; Wright 2009 ). Critics of southern migrants had long charged them with being too transient. Geary believed that the project provided the community with the possibility of ''sinking roots'' in Uptown. This put him in direct opposition with the members of the UCC who were determined to rid Uptown of southern whites through slum clearance, and who saw the community college as socially and economically invigorating (Siegel 2002:222) .
Initial Success for the Village
Uptown would prove to be more difficult to transform than the business-dominated Uptown Community Council had imagined. When Wright presented the Hank Williams Village plan at an UCCC meeting, the Chicago Department of Urban Renewal's (DUR) director, Art Levine, announced that the DUR would consider it. This aggravated members of the UCC, and the UCCC who had eyed the college as the key to renewed economic development in Uptown. Wright also presented alternative sites for the college, one of which was an abandoned amusement park, which would result in little, if any, displacement of residents (Wright 2009a) . The Village had also gained an influential supporter when the Kate Maremont Foundation publicly expressed opposition to the location of the college because of its impact on displacing residents in Uptown (Butler 1969a; Flaherty 1969) . In this first round of hearings, it appeared that Hank Williams Village would prevail.
The proponents of the Village, however, had not anticipated the magnitude of those against the project. W. Clement Stone, owner of Combined Insurance Company located in Uptown, opposed the idea of the Village in part because the backers were a left-leaning coalition of the poor. Hank Williams Village was planned in the shadow of the Combined Insurance building on Broadway in Uptown. This deeply troubled Stone who was a staunch political conservative (Siegel 2002) . The UCC also continued to vigorously side with the Board of the Chicago City College who had recently approved locating the new college campus in Uptown at a cost of $25 million (Flaherty 2009 ).
In spite of this substantial opposition, the UCCC initially voted unanimously to approve and recommend construction of the Hank Williams Village to the DUR. The only stipulation was that Wright and Geary present firm financial commitments within 30 days. The atmosphere in the meeting was highly charged before the vote. The Chair of the UCCC, Urania Damofle, railed on the supporters of the Village labeling them ''militant'' and ''bleeding hearts'' (Siegel 2002:321) . Geary had called in a group of raucous supporters to the meeting. Before the vote, Geary shouted that the UCCC might see ''Uptown burning'' if the college were built. In addition, the majority of those who spoke at the meeting were opposed to the college plan. There had also been several recent high-profile visits to Uptown by U.S. Congressman Richard Yates, and a state senator both of whom opposed displacement, and supported the Village plan (Siegel 2002) . After the meeting, a jubilant Geary announced, ''We have the commitments . . . Hank Williams Village is alive . . . '' (Sussman 1969:1) . However, some members of the UCCC believed that Wright would never be able to secure funding. Wright admitted that he had encountered trouble while trying to raise money for the Village (Sussman 1969) .
To the UCCC, the funding provision was a difficult hurdle and seemed to ensure that the Village would never come to fruition. However, to their surprise, Wright reported at the next UCCC meeting that he had secured $475,000 in preconstruction commitments and a $10-million agreement from a developer to build a 22-story high rise as part of Hank Williams Village. Wright immediately urged the UCCC to notify the DUR in order to initiate purchase the land (Sussman 1969) . A month later, in June 1969, the UCCC voted to appoint a subcommittee to investigate the veracity of the financial backing before agreeing to recommend Hank Williams Village (Butler 1969b) . After much wrangling and turmoil in meetings, the UCCC reversed their support by voting to reject the proposal for Hank Williams Village in July 1970. Their decision was based on the subcommittee's determination that Wright and the UAPPC had insufficient funds to purchase property options. This meant that Wright would not be able to secure any loans from the Federal Housing Authority until the Hank Williams Village proposal had been submitted to the FHA, which relied on the UCCC recommending it to the DUR. This administrative catch-22 was a deathblow to the Village. The UCCC then voted to recommend the construction of the college to the Department of Urban Renewal. The two-year battle for Hank Williams Village was over.
Geary wrote about those who opposed Hank Williams Village in the Uptown Light, a newsletter for the UAPPC. In a column entitled ''Freedom or Death,'' he wrote, ''As for the people who do not want us here we know that you have set out to make Uptown a Gold Coast and ship our families back to farms . . . '' The column ends with a grim prediction for southern whites in Uptown ''we cannot go back to anywhere'' (Geary 1969:1) . A year later, Geary ran for Alderman in Uptown and lost, winning only 6 percent of the vote. Shortly after that, two small articles in a local newspaper stated that he was leaving Uptown to build a summer camp for youth in his birthplace of Horsebranch, Kentucky (Blasko 1970; Flaherty 1970) .
To make room for the initial construction, 19 buildings were demolished. A letter appeared in the Uptown News calling the razing of the buildings intolerable and stated that the white southerners ''once again will be the real losers'' referring to their original flight from the coalfields and farms in the South (Blasko, 1970:3) . Harry S. Truman College was completed in 1976 at a cost of $16.5 million. Mayor Daley, the Governor of Illinois, and former Congressman, John McCormick, friend of President Truman, were present at the dedication (Carlos 1976 ). Between 1970 and 1976 units of low-income housing were demolished as part of the construction of the college. Each building razed decreased the southern white population in Uptown. The exact number of people displaced by the construction of the college is still disputed, ranging from 1,800 to 4,000. With the college completed, there was increased urgency to empty buildings of tenants. The promise of gentrification fueled real estate speculation and arson-for-profit. Between 1975 and 1979, fifteen buildings operated by the same individual were destroyed by fire (Fitzpatrick 1970; Zaccor 1987; Bennett, 1997) .
While I was sitting in his living room many years later, architect, Rodney Wright surmised that the project was set up for failure because of the powerful political economic interests that backed the college plan. There is some evidence of this view in the local press at the time (Flaherty 1970) . Wright also hinted that Geary had solicited and received some remuneration in exchange for quelling some of the opposition surrounding the college (Wright 2009 ). However, this has never been officially substantiated, and Geary is now deceased.
Hank Williams Village and Advocacy Planning's Legacy
Sociologically, the events surrounding Hank Williams Village are provocative on a number of levels. The movement to enter poor and disadvantaged neighborhoods was a response to an ideological shift in planning, influenced by social change and national events in the 1960s. Clearly, advocacy planning shared an ideological connection with social movements of the 1960s and early 1970s. It also followed the entry of other professionals into marginalized communities. The experience suggests that professionals of the dominant culture can bridge the gaps between the rich and poor and work toward a common community goal. In large part, this kept the community in charge of planning and the held the planners accountable (Kennedy 2007 ). The Uptown experience shows that it was possible for planners and architects to go out into poor communities, and work with marginalized groups.
On the most basic level, however, it appears to represent a failure of advocacy planning because the project never won approval. In short, while planning occurred, the project never materialized. Families were displaced, homes were demolished, and lives were ineluctably altered. Perhaps, this is because the process left no court or public hearing in which to plead a case as Davidoff envisioned it. To act as an attorney representing a client would require that Wright be able to put forth his plan before an impartial body. In practice, the public hearing before the UCCC became the court in which Wright argued his case. Not only were the residents of Uptown dependent on the professional planner/architect to act on their behalf, the UCCC was hardly an impartial and disinterested group. As stated, it was more than likely stacked with college supporters. Certainly, the Chair, Urania Demofle, referring to the supporters of the Village as ''militant'' and ''radicals'' evidenced some bias (Siegel 2002:321) .
In addition, the events surrounding Hank Williams Village raises questions on the role of advocacy planners. The verve, moxie, and idealism of the Wrights may have obfuscated their role of advocates. After all, this was a new movement and, therefore, the players were groping in a sense in their new roles. This point did not escape the AIA. When advocacy planning flourished in cities and community design centers were actively engaging residents to plan their own neighborhoods, the AIA expressed concerns about the role and limits of advocacy on behalf of the poor. The AIA questioned how radical these planners could become before they alienated volunteers and, more importantly, financial sources (Fraser 1970) . This final point is clearly pertinent to the case of Hank Williams Village. It is unclear, for example, whether Geary's radical public posture, writings, and organizations (UAPPC/VOP) dried up potential funding and support for the Village. In the process of planning the Village, Wright became inextricably linked to Geary and the UAPPC. The Design Center was housed in UAPPC offices. In addition, as mentioned, when people found out which project Wright was seeking to fund, some were unwilling to provide financial backing (Sussman 1969) .
Certainly, advocacy planning was not without intellectual critics at the time of its ascendance and practice in cities like Chicago and New York. Some argued that by rejecting a top-down comprehensive plan and embracing a market of competing plans, advocacy planning was ''countervailing'' and favored the poor by giving them more weight in negotiating plans. In this view, since the poor have been traditionally marginalized, advocates are free and justified to abandon the objectivity contained in the democratic principles of advocacy planning in favor of class interest (Dyckman 1971) . Therefore, what is in theory intended to be a consensual bottom up process becomes subverted by those historically marginalized.
In this view, the poor are willing to discount the procedural ideals of advocacy planning because they distrust the middle and upper classes. As a result, they are less interested in achieving rational outcomes in planning decisions, but prefer to personalize competing plans as put forth by opponents (Peattie 1968) . A survey of tenants facing displacement by the college plan revealed widespread opposition to moving out of Uptown (Siegel 2002:331) . The notion that the college supporters were ''the enemy'' is easy to imagine-an easy target. When residents worked with the Wrights to plan Hank Williams Village, they were responding to an external force that would push them from their homes just as they had been driven out of the South. Geary managed to tap into that vein of pent up emotion, making the fight for Hank Williams Village a fight for their home in Uptown. In the end, disadvantaged residents seldom prevail against redevelopment, gentrification, or similar external threats to their neighborhoods. The struggle for Hank Williams Village was no exception.
Advocacy Planning-Now and Beyond
Advocacy planning never went away. It lives on in a patchwork of organizations (e.g., Campaign for Community-Based Planning and Planners Network successor to Planners for Equal Opportunity) and cities like New York, Post-Katrina New Orleans, and Boston. Observers recognize the limits of advocacy planning of the past and argue that it is not as applicable to the nature of planning today. Since the 1970s, planning has witnessed more privatization and less role for government compared to the era in which the events surrounding Hank Williams Village ensued. Privatization has placed government in the role of supporting fragmented private sector projects instead of overseeing and coordinating large publicly funded projects. Therefore, the obvious target of advocacy planners is often more obscure that it was when the Wrights engaged in it in Uptown. As a result, there is less opportunity for planning with the community. In short, advocacy planning has moved from being what some have termed, ''participatory democracy'' to a ''representative democracy'' in which planning is done for the people as opposed to with them as was the case with Hank Williams Village (Kennedy 2007:25) . Some, however, believe that in its current form progressive planning or community-based planning is much more in line with what Davidoff envisioned in 1965 (Angotti 2007) . This approach views community development as being synonymous with development of community members through the transfer of planning knowledge. Seen another way, the end game for planning is a more empowered community so that the project (e.g., housing) also engenders community capacity to meet their planning needs in the future. This distinction has been termed redistributive planning versus transformative. In short, the goals of planning should be oriented toward redistributing wealth as well as redistributing power to disadvantaged groups (Kennedy 2007) . This recognizes that the genesis of advocacy planning was in structural conditions that produced inequality.
Advocacy planning has also found its way into the environmental justice movement, which melds elements of social justice with the development of the physical environment. Brooklyn's Red Hook neighborhood is a significant example of planners and residents organizing to resist city plans to locate two sludge treatment plants in an area already the site of other waste transfer stations (Angotti 1996) . That environmental justice campaigns have involved advocacy planning provides rich opportunities for sociological study. Sociologists interested in advocacy planning have an abundance of community studies to draw upon as models for engaging in research. In addition, the staging ground for advocacy planning and environmental justice campaigns is a natural arena for examining the redistributive/transformative distinction discussed above because it involves the changing the social consciousness of participants. In the Hank Williams Village case, this is challenging because it took place over 40 years ago. It is impossible to measure, for example, whether the legacy of social resistance in the Uptown neighborhood is linked to the transformative effect of the fight for Hank Williams Village. However, the approach would be ideal for sociologists seeking to study the effects of advocacy planning and environmental justice campaigns on the participants regardless of a win or loss.
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